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Abstract: Do labor mobility and co-worker networks contribute to convergence or divergence
between regions? Based on the previous literature, labor mobility contributes to knowledge transfer
between firms. Therefore, mobility may contribute to decreasing productivity differences, while
limited mobility sustains higher differences. The effect of co-worker networks, however, can be
two-fold in this process; they transmit information about potential jobs, which may enhance the
mobility of workers—even between regions—and this enhanced mobility may contribute to levelling
of differences. However, if mobility between regions involves movement costs, co-worker networks
may concentrate locally—possibly contributing to the persistence of regional differences. In this
paper, we build an agent-based model of labor mobility across firms and regions with knowledge
spillovers that reflects key empirical observations on labor markets. We analyze the impact of
network information provided about potential employers in this model and find that it contributes
to increasing inter-regional mobility, and subsequently, to decreasing regional differences. We also
find that both the density of coworker networks, as well as their regional concentrations, decrease if
network information is available.
Keywords: labor mobility; co-worker networks; regional inequality; knowledge spillovers; agent-based
simulation
1. Introduction
Worker mobility is a major source of transferring knowledge between firms, as firms
utilize the incoming personnel’s knowledge and skills that they have acquired throughout
their careers [1–4]. A piece of direct evidence for this knowledge spillover is that hiring
workers from better-performing firms increases the recipient firms’ productivity [5–8]. In
addition, increased wages of workers at the recipient firm after hiring personnel from
high-performing competitors indicates the within-firm diffusion of new knowledge [9].
These knowledge spillovers through labor mobility have implications for productivity
differences within sectors or regions as well. Knowledge transfers between firms may
decrease productivity differences, while constraints to knowledge transfer can explain why
productivity differences are sustained. An example of sustained productivity differences
has been observed in the U.S. manufacturing sectors, where the productivity of the 90th
percentile is twice the productivity of the 10th percentile on average, and even higher in
some sectors [10]. In India and China, even higher differences have been observed [11].
Previous studies have concentrated on the (lack of) market competition when explaining
these differences [12,13], or competition advantages due to export activities [14]. However,
the role of labor mobility was not examined in these studies.
Regarding regional analysis, high levels of mobility between related industries, and an
increasing density of co-worker networks are shown to contribute to higher growth rates
of regions [15–17]. Different mechanisms were proposed to explain this finding. First, high
mobility can contribute to agglomeration externalities. Second, dense coworker networks
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also induce better employer–employee matching. In addition, network density can be an
indicator of social capital and trust, which supports learning from contacts [15–17].
Furthermore, knowledge transfer via labor mobility may also contribute to the catch-
up of lagging regions to more developed ones. Skills of migrants returning from more
developed regions may boost the productivity of a local sector [18,19], which has been
shown when external shocks—such as the economic crisis—or changes in immigration
policy have forced many migrants to return home.
Why, however, would migrants move (back) to lower-developed regions in the ab-
sence of such shocks? Unrealized expectations in returns for skills (e.g., low wages and
unemployment) may be one reason [20], but potential returns of accumulated human
capital together with lower price levels may be another [21,22].
Our first aim, therefore, is to connect these studies by creating a model of volun-
tary labor mobility with which we can assess how labor mobility levels up within- and
between-regional productivity differences, and how obstacles to labor mobility contribute
to preserving these differences. Our second aim is to examine the role of co-worker net-
works. Although we have empirical observations about regional growth and co-worker
networks [15–17], we know less about the mechanisms, i.e., how they contribute to the
catching-up of regions. Furthermore, while the role of obstacles to labor mobility in sus-
taining regional differences is relatively straightforward to predict, the role of co-worker
networks in this picture is less simple.
Not only do networks of former coworkers serve as transmitters of knowledge be-
tween firms, they also convey information about employees and employers. As the labor
market is characterized by imperfect or asymmetric information, this influences labor mo-
bility in different ways [23]. First, networks may transmit information about job vacancies
to unemployed persons. This predicts that employment probability is correlated across
social networks, and that network size increases the chance of employment [24]. In this
regard, it has also been shown that an increased employment rate across former coworkers
strongly increases workers’ re-employment probability after unemployment [25].
Secondly, information available from former coworkers decreases the uncertainty of
employers about the “quality” of candidates [26]. This model shows that the consequence of
having former co-workers at a company is increased starting wages. The existence of such
a wage gain has been shown empirically—a fact that has been explained by two rationales:
First, that by network information firms can select workers with better unobserved skills,
and secondly, that such networks enable workers to choose from higher productivity (and
thus higher paying) firms [27,28]. Another consequence is that employers are more likely
to hire workers with whom their current workers have connections [29].
A third approach assumes that workers’ networks transmit information about the
employer–employee fit [30–32]. They assume, based on the matching model of Jovanovic [33],
that each worker has a potential (productivity) that is firm-specific. That is, different
workplaces require workers with different skills, and if they match, that makes the worker
productive. However, being successful at one firm does not necessarily mean that the same
worker will be successful at a different one. This matching factor is assumed to be unknown
to the workers and firms a priori, and is revealed to them over time with employment, or
by network information. Supporting empirical evidence of this model includes the fact that
referred workers have higher initial wages and lower turnover than non-referred ones, and
that this wage difference gradually declines with tenure [30,32]. A further consequence is
that information on matching makes employers more attractive where former coworkers
are present; thus, there is a tendency for workers to follow each other across firms [32].
Concerning the regional impacts of this, job referrals especially facilitate job transi-
tions between different regions, e.g., the movement of workers from rural areas to the
city [34]. Therefore, with more extended coworker information networks, increased mobil-
ity between regions can be expected at the first instance. This increased mobility, due to
knowledge spillovers, may therefore be expected to decrease regional differences. Relat-
edly, concerning the impact of networks on geographical mobility, it is known that social
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networks between regions create self-sustaining migration systems [35], which suggests
that the initial connections may cause persistent effects.
However, it is a widely observed property of geographic mobility that it is nega-
tively related to distance, as mobility over long distances includes different material and
non-material costs, e.g., [36]. This implies that coworker networks also tend to cluster
locally [37]. People with more extended local networks, furthermore, tend to be less likely
to move [38,39]. It is therefore also possible that the more extensive the network informa-
tion, the greater the tendency of forming local concentrations of coworker networks; thus,
coworker networks may not contribute to decreasing regional differences at all, or may
even amplify them.
Accordingly, we examine a model of labor mobility and productivity spillovers by
adding the informative role of co-worker networks. Utilizing this, we study the relationship
between mobility and productivity differences within and between regions, and the specific
role of co-worker information in this relationship.
2. Method
An analytical model of voluntary labor mobility with heterogeneous workers and
firms is in itself a rather complicated exercise (a well-known example is by Burdett and
Mortensen [40]), and there are also useful examples for modelling labor mobility together
with network information, e.g., [31]. We believe, however, that applying an analytical
model of voluntary labor mobility to heterogeneous workers and firms with network infor-
mation and productivity spillovers would be extremely difficult. Therefore, to study the
relationship between these phenomena, we turn to the technique of agent-based modelling.
Agent-based models originate from equation-based models in natural sciences, which are
widely applicable to problems in socio-economic sciences [41]. They assume independent,
adaptive, and autonomous actors that follow simple rules, which is congruent with the
foundations of economics and micro-sociology. The key assets of the models that we
utilize are that they can serve as experiments for social sciences, and for studying complex,
emergent outcomes of systems that are not directly derivable from individual actions [42],
or from what one could derive from a mean-field mathematical model. For our purpose of
studying labor mobility, these are important features, as real experiments are constrained
by ethical considerations—and even the possibility of empirical analysis is limited to partial
relationships in which external shocks can be utilized due to the endogenous relationships
between our variables (e.g., between mobility and productivity differences).
When creating the model, we built on general assumptions of existing models in labor
economics to maintain comparability, and took into consideration the generic nature of our
assumptions. Empirically, we set parameters according to existing studies where observa-
tions were available, and tested our predictions on different parameter settings, considering
those parameters where no such observations existed. We used the Netlogo program for the
simulations. The code for the simulations is included in the Supplementary Materials.
2.1. Initial Setting
To start, we initially distributed the NW workers across the NF firms. We gener-
ated an initial heterogeneity in the firms’ productivity according to uniform distribution:
A = {U 0,1}. This represents the heterogeneity of the capabilities of firms, which may be
associated with “managerial talent”, corresponding to the model of Lucas [43].
We assumed that a fixed, β share of firms’ productivity was paid to the worker as a
wage; thus, the wage of each worker at firm j was W = βAj. In addition, each worker had
a firm-specific non-wage utility, µij which was also drawn from a uniform distribution,
µij = {U −0.5,0.5}. This added the heterogeneity of workers’ preferences to the model. This
represents how much workers like the type of the job they do at the firm, across dimensions
in which taste is heterogeneous; for example, whether they have to be autonomous, or
have well-structured tasks; if they have to work in teams or independently; if it requires
Entropy 2021, 23, 1451 4 of 16
social or analytic skills, etc. Workers consider this non-wage utility together with wage,
and thus, they maximize their total utility, Wj + µij.
An important property of this setting is that workers were homogeneous in the sense
that they did not differ in their productivity (skills). In this sense, our approach is different
from Lise, Meghir, and Robin [44] and Lopes de Melo [45], and similar to Pissarides [46]
and Nagypál [47]. Our approach was also related to the setting of Simon and Warner [30],
Dustmann et al. [31] and Glitz and Vejlin [32], in the sense that we assumed that the
match between firms and workers was firm-specific; however, in those models, workers
have heterogeneous productivity (which is firm-specific)—while in our study, the match-
specific component was the non-wage utility. Furthermore, in those models, the firms are
homogeneous—while in our case, the productivity of workers was similar. The reason for
our choice of analyzing workers with similar skills was that having heterogeneous workers
together with heterogeneous firms would raise the question of a positive interaction
between workers’ productivity and firms’ productivity, and the subsequent sorting of
high-ability workers to high-productivity firms [48]. In addition, this setting would call for
the analysis of another role of social networks—the signaling of worker productivity to
firms [26]. Thus, although the influence of sorting on mobility—and the role of co-worker
networks in this process—is an important question, we believe that it would be more
appropriate to analyze that question in a different model.
Concerning parameter β, we can interpret it as the bargaining power of the workers,
similar to the model of Nagypál [47]. For our purposes, however, it was exogenous
and constant, and not specific to the worker–firm relationship. In specific terms, we can
manipulate the weight of the non-wage utility compared to wage by this parameter. We set
this parameter to β = 0.5, but also tested how it influenced the equilibrium.
Our workers represent overlapping generations; they were active for forty periods—
thus, one period corresponded to one year on the labor market. Afterwards, they retired,
and new workers replaced them. We started the model with heterogeneous initial experi-
ence to avoid periodic fluctuations.
In the model, we assumed imperfect information, where workers are uncertain about
their firm-specific fit (non-wage utility, µij) at their prospective workplaces. They choose,
therefore, based on Wj + E(µij), where E(µij) is the average value in the population.
However, once employed, the true µij parameter for their current employment is revealed
to them. At a later stage, we introduced the network information that reveals the true
µij parameter for the potential workers. Thus, in this respect we followed the network
information models of Simon and Warner [30] and Dustmann et al. [31].
Similarly, we introduced labor mobility by assuming that jobs were destroyed at an
exogenous rate, δ. Workers whose jobs were destroyed had to choose a new job (N.B. the
model would be very similar if we did not assume job destruction, but rather that people
at different points of their life change their preferences about jobs). In addition, workers
with existing jobs may also change workplaces. Both groups are allowed to choose among
the available offers, which arrived at a rate λ. We set the job destruction parameter to
δ = 0.1, as it directly influences the mobility rate, and we would like these parameters to
be around the empirically observable range (job separation and hire rates have been 8–16%
in the U.S in recent decades [49]). The parameter of the arrival rate allowed the model to
reflect real-world decisions better compared to the perfect information assumption. We set
the arrival rate parameter at λ = 0.1 levels throughout the simulations and tested how it
influenced the equilibrium.
2.2. Labor Mobility and Knowledge Spillovers
The special feature of our model is that we added knowledge transfers to the labor
mobility model. We assumed that if workers move, the new firm may utilize some of their
experience, creating a productivity spillover. We specified this the following way: The
movement of a worker from firm a to firm b yields:
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{
A′b = Ab +
(Aa−Ab)θ
Nb
i f Aa > Ab
A′b = Ab i f Aa ≤ Ab,
and A′a = Aa, (1)
where A′ is the changed productivity parameter, θ < 1 is a parameter representing the
transferability of knowledge, and Nb is the number of workers at firm b. This specification
is identical to Stoyanov and Zubanov [6] and Csáfordi et al. [8] in the formulation that
the weight of new knowledge brought by a single worker decreases by the number of
incumbent workers, and corresponds to their empirical findings that negative productivity
differences do not cause changes. We set the spillover parameter to θ = 0.3, corresponding
to the empirical estimates in these studies.
Turning back to the decision on mobility, we assumed that this productivity spillover
was incorporated into the wage offer, so firms offer wages to workers based on their
previous careers and their subsequent future productivity. We also assumed that the
mobility of workers is costly, and therefore, that workers leave their workplace only if their
benefit exceeds a switching cost parameter SC. Therefore, the worker i switches from firm







> µia + βAa + SC i f Aa > Ab
E(µib) + βAb > µia + βAa + SC i f Aa ≤ Ab
(2)
If the productivity of a recipient firm increased due to the experience of the incoming
workers, we assumed that this firm also increased the wages of its incumbent worker
accordingly, from W = βAj to W ′ = βA′ j, so that there would be no wage differentials
within the firm between the workers (who were assumed to be similar in skills). This
positive externality of new knowledge on the wage of incumbent workers was in line with
the results of Poole [9].
We implemented labor mobility in two steps: First, those workers whose jobs were
lost look for a job; they choose from the available offers according to Equation (2). As the
subsequent productivity spillovers influence the optimal choice of those workers whose
jobs were not lost too, we next re-considered their workplace choice, allowing voluntary
mobility. The number of offers workers can choose from was determined by the arrival
rate parameter, so they get λNF offers. Next, they consider these alternatives and consider
the best one according to the left-hand side of Equation (2). If they find this best alternative
favorable enough, that is, if the inequality in Equation (2) holds, they take this option—
otherwise, they stay. In the model, the extent of mobility is influenced by the extent of
job loss and the switching cost parameters, of which the first remains fixed, and only the
switching costs are manipulated. To sum up, each turn of the simulation consists of the
following subsequent steps:
1. Jobs are lost, and the workers affected look for a new workplace.
2. The mobility of these workers creates productivity spillovers that may change the
productivity of firms, and firms update the wage of their workers according to the
new productivity levels.
3. Workers are given the opportunity of voluntary mobility.
This setting neatly reproduces the key empirical observation in labor economics
that larger firms offer higher wages [50]. This correlation in the model follows from the
assumption that firms are heterogeneous in their capabilities (i.e., productivity), and that
more productive firms pay higher wages—therefore, they are more likely to attract more
workers, as suggested by Lucas (1978). However, in our setting, it was not the decreasing
marginal returns in the production function, but rather the heterogeneity in workers’ non-
wage utility that prevented the firm with the highest capability from taking over the whole
labor market.
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2.3. Regions
Our key interest in this study was the effect of labor mobility on regional differences.
To study this, we introduced regions, trying to keep the model as simple as possible. To
be able to assess whether labor mobility contributes to the convergence of the regions, we
created two regions with different average productivity levels. At the beginning of the
simulation, firms with equal probability were allocated to regions at random. Next, the
initial productivity of firms was determined randomly, and a constant “regional difference”
parameter was deducted from the firm if it is in Region 1. Thus, one can also think of
Region 2 as being in a more developed center, and Region 1 as a representative for the less
developed periphery. We did not allow firms to relocate between regions, but workers
could move between them.
However, we assumed that mobility for workers is more costly between regions,
than moving to a firm within their current region. Accordingly, we assumed that when
changing jobs, they face two types of mobility costs: they bear a general switching cost (SC)
if they change workplaces, but if they choose a firm in the other region, the cost of moving
(MC) adds to this. This modified the condition under which worker i moves from a more







> µia + βAa + SC + MC (3)
where MC = 0 if firm a and b are located in the same region.
2.4. Innovation
In this setting, the following dynamics can be observed. If a worker moves from a
less productive firm to a more productive one, the productivity differences between them
do not change. However, if a worker moves from a productive firm to a less productive
one, the difference in productivities decreases. Therefore, productivity differences will
continuously decrease, unless there is no mobility in the system. However, in reality,
we experience persistent mobility and productivity differences, so it would be a more
appropriate property of the model to reflect this phenomenon. Therefore, we had to
introduce a force of divergence of productivities to the model—which will be innovation.
We borrowed this idea from the “escape competition” model of Aghion and Grif-
fith [51], and assumed that more productive firms are more likely to develop a productivity-
enhancing innovation (however, we assume that others do not imitate the innovators, but
learn through labor mobility).
In our system, in each round one firm innovates, which is costless, and increases
its productivity by a constant parameter of INN. The selection of the innovating firm is
random; however, it is not made with uniform probability—the likelihood of each firm
becoming the successful innovator is proportional to its current productivity, thus:




In the simulation, innovation thus consists of two steps:
1. Selecting the one innovator firm according to Equation (4).
2. Adding INN to its current productivity.
We implemented innovation directly before the step of voluntary labor mobility, so
workers could adjust to this by voluntary mobility. Furthermore, as a final adjustment, we
deflated the productivities by the change in the average productivity of all firms at the end
of each round. This is necessary because otherwise, productivity would grow continuously
in the system, which would result in higher and higher wages; thereby, the weight of the
non-wage element in the workers’ choice would slowly but gradually vanish.
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3. Results
3.1. Equilibrium in the Basic Model
After including innovation in the model, it produced persistent mobility and pro-
ductivity dispersion over a reasonable set of parameters. After an initial adjustment, the
simulations stabilized on an equilibrium level of mobility and productivity dispersion
(Figure 1b,d). It was also observable that if we increased switching costs, this equilibrium
level of productivity dispersion decreased and the level of mobility increased. On the other
hand, without innovation, the productivities of the firms converged and the productivity
dispersion disappeared, even if switching costs were present (Figure 1a).
Figure 1. Productivity dispersion and mobility with and without innovation. (a) Productivity dispersion with no innovation
(INN = 0). (b) Productivity dispersion with positive innovation (INN = 0.1). (c) Mobility with no innovation (INN = 0).
(d) Mobility with positive innovation (INN = 0.1). Productivity dispersion is measured by the interquartile range divided
by the median, following [10]. Parameters: Np = 300 persons, N f = 30 f irms, β = 0.5, δ = 0.1, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.3.
Intuitively, the presence of a stable level of productivity dispersion originates from the
following two factors: First, if a firm gets more productive, it attracts more workers and
grows bigger, at the expense of the others, which become smaller. However, these small
firms benefit more if they can gain a worker from the more productive one, as the mobile
worker’s knowledge disperses more easily in a small community. This is represented by
the number of the recipient firm’s workers (Nb) in the denominator of the spillover formula
in Equation (1).
Additionally, as the firm grows bigger, the chances increase that a randomly selected
worker whose job has been lost will be drawn from that firm.
One can expect, however, that if mobility costs increase over a certain threshold,
some firms can gain some productivity by the innovation mechanism, and consequently,
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pay such high wages that moving away to any other firms will not be attractive for any
of its workers, because the productivity spillovers and the difference in non-wage util-
ity cannot compensate the wage differences any more—thereby it slowly overtakes the
whole labor market. In this case, they may also benefit from the cumulative nature of
the innovation mechanism (that innovation happens with a higher probability at firms
that already have high productivity), and increase their productivity further and further
away from the other firms; thus, they successfully “escape” from the competition. The
emergence of this phenomenon is examined in Figure 2, with concern to mobility costs
and innovation rates. Figure 2a suggests that within the reasonable range of parameters
(SC ∈ [0, 1], INN ∈ [0, 1]), firms are not able to escape from their competitors, as labor
mobility transfers the innovation to competitors. Still, if the innovation rate increases, the
highest productivity firm tends to have some advance in productivity. If the innovation
rate is high and the cost of mobility is low, these firms gain a significant share of workers;
however, they do not overtake the whole market (Figure 2b). Firms escaping the compe-
tition by innovation only happens if the mobility costs are increased to a very high level
(SC > 3), and if the innovation rate is also high. The yellow area in Figure 2a shows that
one firm escaped from the competition (As the mean productivity in the beginning is 0.5,
and the average productivity over the simulations is normalized to this level, the highest
productivity value of 15 indicates that one firm of the 30 ones has productivity 15, and all
others have 0). In the range of switching costs of 3 < SC < 8.5, these firms tend to take
over the whole labor market, which happened in the following way: At the beginning
of the simulation, productivity levels are relatively even, and very high switching costs
prohibit any labor mobility. Due to the high innovation rates, a ‘fortunate’ firm tends to
increase its productivity and start to gain a significant advantage. After getting such a
high productivity advantage that the wage difference exceeds the switching cost, workers
from the lagging firms can move to the high productivity firm, but the switching costs
prohibit mobility in the reverse direction. In some of the simulations, it is not one, but two
firms that escape from the competition, and a duopoly emerges—indicated by the green
dots on Figure 2a,b. If, however, the switching costs are increased to an even higher level
(SC > 8.5 in the 30 firm setting), they tend to prohibit all mobility—even between a firm
with a maximum and minimum productivity level. Therefore, a firm typically escapes the
competition by innovation, but it cannot overtake the labor market, as mobility is zero
(Figure 2c).
It can be observed that innovation adds additional motivation for mobility. If a firm
innovates, its productivity increases together with the wages offered by it, which creates
the motivation to join the firm, which in turn opens up the opportunity for new mobility.
Therefore, the combination of maintaining low switching costs and raising the innovation
rate increased mobility (Figure 2c). Taken together, the analysis indicates that the dynamics
of the model were stable over a wide range of the parameters (SC ∈ [0, 1], INN ∈ [0, 1]);
as such, our analysis did not concentrate on an extreme setting.
Examination of the workers over their life cycle reveals that their mobility rate was the
highest at the beginning of their career, when their firm-specific non-wage utility increased.
Later they found their ideal jobs, and their non-wage utility stabilized, and mobility settled
at a lower level (Figure 2d). This corresponds to the empirical observations of the labor
economics literature [52].
Concerning the impact of the bargaining power and job arrival rate parameters,
mobility rate was hardly affected by these (Figure 2e); except in trivial cases, i.e., if the job
arrival rate was zero (workers have offers to choose from), mobility was consequently zero.
A small positive impact of the beta parameter could be observed, which was due to the
increased available wages (as wage is productivity multiplied by beta) compared to the
fixed switching costs. Productivity differences, however, were influenced more by the job
arrival rate (Figure 2f). In cases where the job arrival rate was low, mobility contributed
to leveling up productivity differences compared to when there was no mobility (λ = 0).
On the contrary, when the arrival rate was high, i.e., when mobile workers were allowed
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to get admitted to any firms on the market that they wished, productivity differences
increased. In this case, workers could pick the highest productivity (best-paying) firms, so
high-productivity firms would employ the bulk of the workers, who would not move to
lower-productivity firms; thus, knowledge transfer would be limited.
Figure 2. Equilibria over different ranges of the parameters. (a) The effect of the mobility cost and innovation rate on
maximal productivity. (b) The effect of the mobility cost and innovation rate on the largest firm’s size. (c) The effect of the
mobility cost and innovation rate on yearly mobility rate. (d) Mobility and non-wage utility by workers’ experience. (e) The
effect of the job arrival rate and bargaining power on mobility. (f) Maximal productivity by job arrival rate and bargaining
power. Notes. (a–c): Each dot represents one simulation at the 1000th step (a higher number of steps was necessary to study
the equilibria due to the inclusion of extreme values). (d): Each line represents the average of 10 simulations at the 100-th step.
(e,f): Each dot represents one simulation at the 100th step Parameters: Np = 300 persons, N f = 30 f irms, β = 0.5, δ = 0.1.
(a–d): λ = 0.1, θ = 0.3.
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3.2. The Effect of Network Information
We examined the effect of co-worker networks by adding the following assumptions:
1. Workers have no initial information about their non-wage utility parameter at prospec-
tive employers if none of their former co-workers works there, but
2. if they have a former co-worker at a firm, their true parameter is revealed for them initially.
This information may influence mobility both positively and negatively. Information
on a bad personal match may dissuade workers from moving to a specific firm, but
information on a good match may encourage mobility.
To get an idea about the effect of this information, consider a special case where
compensating differentials at the current workplace and a prospective workplace are
independent and uniform distributions [0,a], and disregard the expected wages and the
limitation on available options. In such cases, the job mobility rate with no information is
(0.5a− SC)a, as workers expect 0.5 compensating differentials if they have no information.
With full information it is (a−SC)
2
2 , i.e., is always higher than the previous term; thus,
the information increases mobility. Intuitively, this is because although networks can
provide good and bad news, information on one good potential workplace is enough to
motivate mobility.
We can also observe this phenomenon in the simulations, which showed that network
information increased the chances that mobility would result (Figure 3b). It can be observed
that by increasing mobility, the productivity dispersion decreased (Figure 3a). In the figure,
we visualize the results of 100 simulations (at the 100th step, which is sufficient to reach
the stable range after the initial adjustment based on results shown in Figure 1).
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3.3. Comparison to Observed Mobility Patterns
To get some insights into external validity, we compared our predictions on labor
mobility patterns with observational data. Glitz and Vejlin [3] reported the role of previous
coworkers on the mobility of the 4.5 million workers in Denmark. They observed that 33%
of mobile workers moved to firms where they had at least one former co-worker. They
calculated that this figure would have been only 2.1% if mobile workers were allocated
to random workplaces, and 11.4% if those were allocated to random workplaces that are
filled with people with the same education, gender, and regional location as the given
worker. It could be calculated that these region–gender–education cells contained on
average 2760 workers (presumably with significant variance).
We obtained the ratio of mobile workers who moved to a workplace with at least
one former co-worker being present for different sizes of labor markets (Figure 4) from
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the simulations. By increasing the size of the labor market, this figure decreased, due to
the decreasing probability of ending up at the same place just by chance. We found that
this figure was on average 37% in the network information scenario on a labor market
of 3000 workers, close to the observed figure from Denmark. We also found that this
was significantly decreased to 26% if no network information was available (Figure 4).
However, this figure was still significantly higher than that observed in the real data on
random allocation. A possible explanation for this divergence may be due to the wage
differences between firms, as in the simulation, people moved to better-paying firms with a
higher probability; therefore, they tended to end up at these firms with a higher probability
even in the scenario without network information, whereas Glitz and Vejlin used random
allocation as a comparison. In addition, firm size distributions also influence these figures,
which may be different in the comparisons.
Figure 4. Probability of workers following each other across workplaces. Notes: Results from
10 simulations at the 100th step. Parameters: N f = 30, 100 and 300 f irms, β = 0.5, δ = 0.1 , λ = 0.1,
0.03, and 0.01 respectively θ = 0.3, SC = 0.4.
A further consideration on validity concerns the skill-level of workers. Most of the
studies on knowledge transfer by labor mobility consider the mobility of inventors, e.g., [53],
or R&D personnel [4], and even the more general studies we used as references observed
that productivity spillovers increased by skill-level [6], or that they were only observed
for highly educated workers or in professional or technical jobs [9]. Therefore, we should
carefully interpret our prediction, which is relevant to the mobility of skilled personnel.
3.4. Regional Analysis
Our key question was whether labor mobility contributes to the convergence of
the regions, and if so, how networks contribute to this. Therefore, we analyzed regions
with different initial productivity levels. In the simulations we examined scenarios with
significant (40%) initial average productivity differences between them.
Simulations indicate rapidly decreasing productivity differences between regions,
and in our simulations, they reached an economically insignificant level. It could also
be observed that balancing of the average productivity level was quicker in the network
information scenario (Figure 5), but the effect of network information depended on the
level of moving costs. If they were zero (Figure 5a), or they were moderate (Figure 5b),
regional differences leveled up much more quickly if network information was present,
compared to the no-network scenario. In cases where high moving costs were coupled with
significant switching costs (Figure 5c), or if they were very high (Figure 5d), the advantage
of network information was negligible. Nevertheless, we did not see even one example
of network information sustaining regional differences—even when moving costs were
very high.
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Figure 5. Productivity differences between regions with and without network information over different switching costs
and moving cost parameters. Notes: Averages over 100 simulations. Parameters: Np = 300 persons, N f = 30 f irms, β = 0.5,
δ = 0.1, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.3.
We have seen that network information increased mobility, and this remained true
in our two-region model as well. However, our regional analysis revealed an interest-
ing feature—that network information decreased labor mobility within the region, but
increased it between them (Figure 6a). These tendencies were also reflected in the network
structure of the co-worker networks. The modularity of the co-worker network by region
indicated the tendency to which these networks concentrated according to regions. The





[ fkk(`)− f ∗kk]
2 (5)
where ` is a partition of the network to K modules, fkk(`) is the fraction of links within the
k-th module compared to the whole network, and f ∗kk is the same fraction under random
assignment of vertices to modules. In this case, we had K = 2 regions, and f11 and f22 were
the fraction of links within them.
Figure 6b points out that this tendency was weaker in the network information
scenario, corresponding to the higher rate of interregional mobility. In contrast, the overall
density of the network (Figure 6c) was decreased in the network information scenario
despite the overall higher mobility rate. To describe how much the co-worker networks
follow random tendency, we calculate the network entropy measure:
H = 1
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where N is the number of nodes (workers), and ki is the degree of the nodes.
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networks. (d) Entropy of the co-worker networks. Notes: Each distribution represents 100 simulations at the 100th step.
Parameters: Np = 300 persons, N f = 30 f irms, β = 0.5, δ = 0.1, λ = 0.1, θ = 0.3.
Entropy of the networks (Figure 6d) suggests that in the no-information scenario,
movement of the workers is more random, while with network information they are more
likely to follow each other across firms; thus, they expand their co-worker networks less
during their career. This manifests in their lower average degree, and the subsequent lower
density of the co-worker network. Comparing the density and the entropy figures, the
impact of co-worker information appears to be similar on these two measures—suggesting
that the decrease in entropy is due to the decreased average degree of mobility, and
distribution of of mobility across workers did not became more equal.
4. Conclusions
Previous studies have shown empirical evidence for labor mobility resulting in
knowledge-transfer observed in the productivity of firms [6,8]. Our results extend the
literature in economic geography on the role of coworker networks in regional develop-
ment. On the regional level, it was also observed that dense co-worker networks were
associated with regional growth [15–17] and that those distant ties in co-worker networks
provided access to new skills for firms [37]. It was also observed that labor mobility from
developed countries to less developed regions induced by external shocks contributed to
the development of local industries [18,19]. Our model provides a missing piece between
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these findings, suggesting that the micro-mechanism of voluntary labor mobility of workers
is sufficient for the catching-up of less developed regions—even without external shocks.
This implies that easing labor mobility between regions may have a positive impact even
for less developed (peripheral) regions (or countries), as they can exploit the knowledge
transfer from (return) migration.
In addition, our findings suggest that job information transmitted by social networks
can amplify job-related migration, instead of constraining it. This aspect of the model
connects to the literature in labor economics concerning the role of social networks on
labor mobility—especially on studies focusing on how co-worker networks shape labor
mobility patterns [29,32]. Our model also extends the existing knowledge on economic
models of migration [54–56] with the inclusion of firm-level heterogeneity and dynamics
to the model. However, an important difference is in contrast to, e.g., [56], is that in our
model, social networks do not directly decrease mobility costs. Extension of the model
with variation of switching costs based on network connections or geographical proximity
would open up the new research direction of analyzing the role of labor mobility, networks,
and knowledge transfer in a migration system of more than two interconnected regions
with different levels of development, proximity, and network connectedness.
This model also provides new non-trivial insights into how micro-mechanisms of
labor mobility influence the structure of coworker networks, and on the understanding
of the empirical consequences of these. It shows that one feature of co-worker networks
is that they provide information about the potential fit of workers to jobs, which induces
the tendency of workers to follow each other across firms [32], which is manifested by the
decreased density of co-worker networks. Moreover, the model suggests that even in the
presence of limited interregional mobility (movement costs), such network information
is associated with higher interregional mobility and, subsequently, decreased regional
differences. However, we found that the high cost of mobility limits the effect of network
information on speeding up regional convergence.
These features may promote further empirical analysis of the consequences of different
co-worker network structures. In particular, it suggests that although higher density and
entropy of co-worker networks could be associated with a higher potential of facilitating
knowledge flows across firms, more “structured” co-worker networks with lower density
and entropy can be a consequence of and indicator that these networks actually provide
information about jobs, which is then utilized in labor mobility.
Concerning the modelling assumptions, we made the important choice of assuming
workers to be homogenous. When modelling network information, we chose a corre-
sponding model in which networks provide information about the employer–employee
fit. However, the alternative approach is apparent, in which workers are heterogeneous
and networks provide information about their “quality”, following the model of Mont-
gomery [26]. This opens up a different research direction on the impact of networks on the
selection of highly skilled workers in developed regions, or big cities, which is observed in
labor economics [57,58], and has serious consequences on the development of urban–rural
inequalities [59].
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